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CLEARLY ESTABLISHED ENOUGH: THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S
NEW APPROACH TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY IN BELLOTTE V.
EDWARDS*
INTRODUCTION
When should government officers be expected to know that they
are breaking the law? Potential life-or-death situations develop
quickly, and what at first looks like a reasonable decision may have
terrible, unintended consequences. The qualified immunity doctrine
acknowledges this difficulty by protecting government officers from
civil liability when they violate an individual's constitutional or
statutory rights.' Immunity does not apply, however, if the right at
issue has been "clearly established" such that a reasonable person
should have known the conduct to be unlawful.2 This analysis weighs
an individual's interest in vindicating his rights against the
government's interest in allowing public officials to effectively
perform their duties without fear of frivolous lawsuits.' As the Fourth
Circuit noted in deciding the recent case of Bellotte v. Edwards,4
"[q]ualified immunity provides critically important protection when a
reasonable decision in the line of duty turns out to be a bad guess. '
Given the difficult and often dangerous jobs government officers
have, this all makes sense. Problems arise, however, when courts must
determine how "clearly established" a right must actually be to
overcome qualified immunity.6 Unfortunately, the United States
Supreme Court's guidance on the subject has been anything but clear.
In order to find a clearly established right, the Court has seesawed
* © 2012 Daniel K. Siegel.
1. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
2. Id.
3. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984).
4. 629 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2011).
5. Id. at 427.
6. The qualified immunity analysis has traditionally been a two-pronged inquiry:
courts must first determine if a constitutional right has been violated and, if so, whether
the right was clearly established at the time. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001),
overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (holding that this
sequence "is often appropriate, [but] it should no longer be regarded as mandatory"). This
Recent Development focuses on the second prong. For a thorough analysis of Pearson, see
generally Nancy Leong, Rethinking the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts: A Reply to
John Jeffries, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 969 (2011).
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between requiring precedent with a high degree of factual similarity
to the case at hand and allowing broader statements of law to suffice.
No iteration of the test explicitly overrules any other, and the Court
has never fully explained how these tests are supposed to fit together.
This has resulted in a wide variety of approaches across jurisdictions;
as one commentator puts it, "the Constitution means one thing in
Alabama and another in California, at least in the context of whether
victims of abusive government officials are entitled to recover
damages."7
Bellotte illustrates a shift in the Fourth Circuit's approach to
qualified immunity. Before this case, the court generally required
precedent with a very high level of factual similarity to overcome a
qualified immunity defense. West Virginia police, acting on the
mistaken belief that a resident in the Bellottes' home possessed or
had produced child pornography, executed a search warrant on the
home without first knocking and announcing their presence.8 The
Fourth Circuit held that exigent circumstances did not justify the
entry and therefore the police officers had violated the Bellottes'
Fourth Amendment rights.9 The court denied the officers qualified
immunity from the family's § 198310 claim for damages, holding that
the officers had violated clearly established law." No precedent with
similar factual circumstances to this case was available.12 Instead, the
Fourth Circuit held that the officers violated a clearly established
7. Craig T. Jones, Hope for Civil Rights, TRIAL, Apr. 2004, at 38, 38-39. Professor
Saiman has described qualified immunity as being in "a perpetual state of crisis." Chaim
Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155, 1155 (2005). Although the
Supreme Court has frequently addressed the issue, "federal reporters are crammed with
dissents and en banc decisions taking issue over the proper scope and role of qualified
immunity." Id. at 1156.
8. Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 418.
9. Id. at 427.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) provides that
[e]very person who ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....
Similarly, a Bivens action may be brought when a federal officer is involved. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
11. Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 424. The Bellottes also brought claims for excessive force, and
the officers received immunity for all but one of those claims about which there was a
factual dispute. Id. at 426. This Recent Development addresses only the Fourth
Amendment claim regarding the no-knock entry.
12. See id. at 424.
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right by analogizing to cases addressing comparable, although
distinguishable, situations.1 3
This Recent Development argues that the Fourth Circuit was
correct to adopt such an approach to qualified immunity. Although
not explicitly spelled out by the court, this approach presents a
reasonable way to balance the interests at stake in this profoundly
unsettled area of law. Bellotte and subsequent Fourth Circuit
decisions demonstrate that officers may be on notice that they are
violating clearly established rights despite a lack of precedent directly
on point. While beneficial to plaintiffs, this approach is not
necessarily so loose as to impose an unfair burden on government
officers who find themselves in unique, potentially dangerous
situations where the law truly provides no clear guidance. Because
qualified immunity is generally decided by pre-trial motion, this
approach will also likely permit more legitimate civil claims to survive
summary judgment.14 Such an approach furthers at least two
important policy considerations. First, victims of government abuse
will have a better opportunity to recover damages for the violation of
their rights, thus promoting government accountability and avoiding
unconscionable results. Those who have been terribly injured by a
government officer should not be denied their day in court simply
because a virtually identical case has not been previously decided.
Second, this approach will allow the threat of civil liability to play a
bigger role in deterring unconstitutional no-knock entries in the wake
of Hudson v. Michigan,15 where the Supreme Court did away with the
exclusionary rule in such cases.16
Analysis proceeds in five parts. Part I sets forth the facts and
central holdings of Bellotte. Part II briefly discusses the Supreme
Court's seemingly contradictory rulings on qualified immunity and
the ensuing divergence among the circuits. Part II then notes how the
Fourth Circuit generally addressed clearly established rights before
Bellotte. Part III analyzes how Bellotte illustrates a shift in the Fourth
Circuit's approach to qualified immunity and argues that it is a proper
way to handle the issue. Part IV discusses the important policy
13. See id. at 431-32 (Wynn, J., dissenting in part).
14. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982) ("[Pjublic policy at least
mandates an application of the qualified immunity standard that would permit the defeat
of insubstantial claims without resort to trial."). As will be made clear below, many claims
that never make it to trial are far from insubstantial. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., What's
Wrong With Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851, 866-67 (2010).
15. 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
16. Id. at 594.
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objectives this new framework promotes by allowing more legitimate
claims of government abuse to survive summary judgment. Part V
addresses problems this new approach may present, namely the
potentially higher burden on government officers performing difficult
and dangerous jobs. This Recent Development then concludes that
the Fourth Circuit's new approach, while imperfect, is still a
preferable way to address qualified immunity until the Supreme
Court provides further guidance.
I. BELLOTTE V. EDWARDS
On May 31, 2007, a clerk at a Wal-Mart in Winchester, Virginia,
insisted on inspecting photos printed there by Sam Bellotte. 17 Mr.
Bellotte surrendered the photos after admitting that some contained
nudity and then left the store.' 8 Upon noticing that one photograph
depicted male genitalia near what appeared to be a child's face, Wal-
Mart employees contacted the police.'9 The Jefferson County
Sheriff's Department took over the investigation after learning that
Mr. Bellotte was a resident of Jefferson County, West Virginia.20
After reviewing the photo and discovering that Mr. Bellotte and his
wife, Tametta, both had concealed carry permits, Detective Tracy
Edwards secured a search warrant for the Bellotte residence and
arranged for a special operations team to assist in executing the
search warrant.2'
Around 10:15 p.m., the team-armed with pistols, flashlights, and
"hooligan" pry bars22 -entered the house without alerting the
Bellottes to its presence and purpose. 23 The team first encountered
the Bellottes' teenage son, E.B., whom they "subdued and
handcuffed.'24 The Bellottes' young daughter, C.B., was awakened
and led downstairs without handcuffs.25 When the police reached Mrs.
Bellotte's bedroom, she "ran screaming" to get her gun before being
17. Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 418.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Edwards was accompanied by the Jefferson County Special Operations Team,
or "SORT Team." Id.
22. Officially called a Halligan bar, these devices are widely used by law enforcement
and firefighters for forcible entry. FIRE ENGINEERING'S HANDBOOK FOR FIREFIGHTER I
AND II, at 215 (Glenn Corbett ed., 2009).
23. Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 418.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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wrestled to the ground and handcuffed.26 Mr. Bellotte was not in the
house that night.27 After learning of these events, he showed police
evidence proving that the person in the picture was not a child, but a
thirty-five-year-old woman living in the Philippines. 28 No charges
were ever filed against Mr. Bellotte.29
Mrs. Bellotte and her children sued Detective Edwards and the
other officers involved under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.30 The
§ 1983 claims alleged that the officers violated the Bellottes' Fourth
Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and
excessive force.3" The district court denied the defendants qualified
immunity as to the no-knock entry, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.32
Generally, police officers must knock and announce their presence
and purpose before executing a warrant (the "knock-and-announce
rule"). 3  To bypass the knock-and-announce rule, a court must make
a fact-specific inquiry and find that the surrounding circumstances
justified the no-knock entry.34
Here, the Fourth Circuit first considered whether there was a
Fourth Amendment violation and concluded that there was no basis
to excuse the no-knock entry. 35 "Not a single one of the officers'
proffered rationales provides a reasonable, particularized basis to
justify their conduct," Judge Wilkinson wrote for the majority.36 The
officers did not initially seek a no-knock warrant, nor did they
discover any new information after obtaining the warrant that would
26. Id. at 418-19.
27. Id. at 419.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. The court did not review the district court's dismissal of the Bellottes' claims
that "the search warrant was invalid and that certain aspects of the execution of the
warrant were unreasonable." Id. The court granted the officers qualified immunity as to
Mrs. Bellotte's and C.B.'s excessive force claims but denied immunity as to E.B.'s
excessive force claim. Id. at 426. These holdings are beyond the scope of this Recent
Development.
33. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 387 (1997).
34. Id. at 394. No-knock entries are only allowed under exigent circumstances where
police "have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under
the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the
effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence."
Id. "This requirement serves the valuable ends of '(1) protecting the safety of occupants of
a dwelling and the police by reducing violence; (2) preventing the destruction of property;
and (3) protecting the privacy of occupants.' " Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 419 (quoting Bonner v.
Anderson, 81 F.3d 472, 475 (4th Cir. 1996)).
35. Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 419-20.
36. Id. at 424.
2012] 1245
1246 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90
have supported a no-knock entry.37 Unlike other Fourth Circuit cases
where a suspect's violent criminal history,38 threatened suicide,39 or
illegal possession of firearms4° justified a no-knock entry, "the officers
here can point to not even one of these particularized indicia of
risk."'" The court explained that the suspected crime of possessing or
producing child pornography, while "utterly deplorable," was not one
inherently associated with violence, nor did the Bellottes themselves
appear to have a violent disposition.42 The court characterized the
officers' argument that sex offenders are more prone to suicide as
speculative and stated that the generalized nature of the claim could
not establish "a particularized basis that Mr. Bellotte presented an
imminent suicide risk."43
The officers finally argued that the presence of firearms,
combined with the suspected crime, created "the potential for a
perfect storm of violence."' The court rejected this argument as well.
The Fourth Circuit had previously held that the presence of a lawfully
owned firearm by itself could not allow police to dispense with the
knock-and-announce requirement and that there must still be a
particularized finding "that someone inside the home might be willing
to use it."
45
37. Id. at 421.
38. Id. at 420-21 (citing United States v. Grogins, 163 F.3d 795, 799 (4th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a no-knock search was justified because the subject of the investigation had a
violent criminal history involving firearms and had promised to do whatever was necessary
to avoid going back to prison)).
39. Id. at 423 (citing Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 334 (4th Cir. 2009)
(holding that suicide threats by a suspect supported a finding of exigency)).
40. Id. (citing United States v. Wardrick, 350 F.3d 446, 452 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding
that illegal possession of firearms by a convicted felon justified the issuance of a no-knock
search warrant)).
41. Id. at 421.
42. Id. at 420. Judge Wynn's dissent points out that the suspected crime was use of a
minor in producing pornography, not possession of child pornography. Id. at 429 (Wynn,
J., dissenting in part). Detective Edwards testified that she believed a child victim was in
the Bellottes' home, and that this presented a dangerous situation. Id. The officers,
however, did not raise this issue on appeal, a fact that did not escape the majority's notice:
"[W]e cannot adopt an argument too speculative for even the officers in this appeal to
make." Id. at 424 n.2 (majority opinion).
43. Id. at 422. The court also noted that "cases addressing the justifications for no-
knock entries speak primarily in terms of officer safety." Id.
44. Id. at 423 (quoting Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 27, Bellotte, 629 F.3d
415 (No. 10-1115)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Id. (quoting Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The majority further stated, "If the officers are correct, then the knock
and announcement requirement would never apply in the search of anyone's home who
legally owned a firearm." Id. (quoting Gould v. Davis, 165 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir. 1998))
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
In addition to arguing that no Fourth Amendment violation had
occurred, the officers argued they were entitled to qualified immunity
because they could not reasonably have been expected to know that
they were violating the Bellottes' constitutional rights. 46 Again, the
court disagreed. Although no precedent existed dealing with these
exact circumstances,
[t]he absence of "a prior case directly on all fours" here speaks
not to the unsettledness of the law, but to the brashness of the
conduct. Because "a man of reasonable intelligence would not
have believed that exigent circumstances existed in this
situation," we affirm the district court's holding that this no-
knock entry violated the Bellottes' clearly established
constitutional rights and does not warrant an award of qualified
immunity.47
To this point, Judge Wynn filed a dissenting opinion. He first
noted that the officers believed a child victim to be inside the home,
which Detective Edwards thought would produce a dangerous
situation.4" He then argued that in the absence of case law specifically
addressing "the context of a child abuse investigation in which the
child victim and multiple firearms are believed to be in the suspect's
custody," the officers could not reasonably be expected to know their
conduct was unlawful.49
II. THE SUPREME COURT COMPLICATES QUALIFIED IMMUNITY,
AND THE CIRCUITS RESPOND
Despite numerous efforts, the Supreme Court has not provided a
clear, uniform framework to determine when a right has been clearly
established. This has resulted in a striking variety of attempts by the
circuits to make sense of it all. A better understanding of the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Bellotte requires at least a brief overview of how
the analysis for finding clearly established rights has become so
muddled. This Part discusses the Supreme Court's evolving analysis
for finding clearly established rights and the circuits' diverging
(internal quotation marks omitted). The Bellotte court also noted how the officers
admitted at oral argument that "most people in West Virginia have guns." Id.
46. Id. at 419 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
47. Id. at 424 (quoting Bailey v. Kennedy, 349 F.3d 731, 743 (4th Cir. 2003); Pinder v.
Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
48. Id. at 429 (Wynn, J., dissenting in part).
49. Id. at 432.
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responses. It then focuses on the Fourth Circuit's approach to finding
clearly established rights before Bellotte.
A. Finding "Clearly Established" Rights in the Supreme Court
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,"0 the Supreme Court first adopted a
standard of objective reasonableness in qualified immunity analysis:
qualified immunity would only apply in light of the "objective
reasonableness of an official's conduct, as measured by reference to
clearly established law."" l Five years later in Anderson v. Creighton,52
an FBI agent made a warrantless entry into a family's home on the
mistaken belief that a suspect in a recent bank robbery was inside. 3
The Eighth Circuit denied the agent qualified immunity on the
grounds that the right to be free from a warrantless entry absent
exigent circumstances was clearly established, but the court did not
discuss the particular circumstances the agent faced.54 The Supreme
Court reversed, explaining that "the right the official is alleged to
have violated must have been 'clearly established' in a more
particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the
right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right."55 Otherwise,
plaintiffs would be able to undermine this important protection for
government officers "by alleging violation of extremely abstract
rights."56 The Court noted, however, "[t]his is not to say that an
official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very
action in question has previously been held unlawful; but it is to say
that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be
apparent."57
The Court would eventually move away from this preference for
more highly particularized precedent. In United States v. Lanier,58 the
Court held that "general statements of the law are not inherently
incapable of giving fair and clear warning" to an officer that her
conduct is impermissible, even when a court has not yet addressed the
50. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
51. Id. at 818.
52. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
53. Id. at 637.
54. Id. at 640-41.
55. Id. at 640.
56. Id. at 639. Such an approach "would effectively eliminate the defense of qualified
immunity from the law of constitutional torts." Jeffries, supra note 14, at 856.
57. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (citation omitted).
58. 520 U.S. 259 (1997).
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specific conduct at issue.5 9 Five years later, the trend continued in
Hope v. Pelzer.6 ° Larry Hope was a former Alabama prison inmate
who got into a physical altercation with a guard while working on a
chain gang." He was transported back to the prison, where he was
handcuffed to a hitching post and made to remove his shirt.62 Hope
remained there for seven hours, during which time he suffered severe
sunburn and muscle cramps, was denied bathroom breaks, was
provided little water, and was taunted by a guard.63 Hope sued under
§ 1983 for violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment.' 4 He relied on two Eleventh Circuit
cases to show that the prison guards had violated a clearly established
right65: Ort v. White,66 which suggested in dicta that it would be
unconstitutional to deny an inmate water for refusing to work once
taken back to the prison,67 and Gates v. Collier,68 which held that
hitching inmates to a fence for long periods of time violated the
Eighth Amendment.69 The district court granted the defendant guards
qualified immunity, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding that,
"[t]hough analogous, the facts in Gates and Ort are not 'materially
similar' to Hope's situation."7
Relying on its holding in Lanier, the Supreme Court reversed.71
Justice Stevens' majority opinion rejected the Eleventh Circuit's
requirement of "materially similar" precedent,72 explaining that
"officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established
law even in novel factual circumstances."73 The Court noted that
59. Id. at 271.
60. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
61. Id. at 734.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 735.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 736.
66. 813 F.2d 318 (11th Cir. 1987).
67. Id. at 326.
68. 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). In 1980, the Fifth Circuit was split into two circuits,
the Eleventh and the "new Fifth." Bonner v. Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.
1981). All Fifth Circuit cases decided before October 1, 1981, are binding precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit. Id.
69. Gates, 501 F.2d at 1306.
70. Hope v. Pelzer, 240 F.3d 975, 981 (11th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 536 U.S. 730 (2002). The
Eleventh Circuit distinguished Ort by pointing out that the prisoner in that case had been
denied water at a worksite until he resumed working. Id. Gates was distinguishable
because it involved a greater, systemic effort to reform the prison system. Id.
71. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 746 (2002).
72. The Court said that the Eleventh Circuit's decision "exposes the danger of a rigid,
overreliance on factual similarity." Id. at 742.
73. Id. at 741 (emphasis added).
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"materially similar" precedent can be especially helpful in showing a
right to be clearly established, but it is not necessary.74
The Hope doctrine has been criticized as "hopelessly
ambiguous," sounding reasonable in the abstract but providing little
practical guidance.7" Perhaps with this in mind, the Court revisited
qualified immunity two years later in Brosseau v. Haugen.76 There,
Officer Brosseau shot Kenneth Haugen as he fled from the police in a
vehicle.77 Brosseau thought Haugen posed a danger to other officers
on foot and anyone else in the immediate area,78 even though, as
Justice Stevens noted in dissent, at the time of the shooting the
vehicle "was immobile, or at best, had just started moving."79 Haugen
sued under § 1983 for a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to
be free from excessive force. 80 The Ninth Circuit denied qualified
immunity, finding that Tennessee v. Garner81 and Graham v. Connor
82
gave Brosseau "fair warning" that shooting Haugen would violate
clearly established constitutional rights. 83  The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that this precedent was "cast at a high level of
74. Id. In response to Hope, the Eleventh Circuit adopted a new framework for this
analysis, separating allegedly unconstitutional conduct into three categories of precedent:
a category of "obvious clarity" where no case law is needed to clearly establish a right; a
category of "broad statements of principle ... not tied to particularized facts"; and a
category for "precedent that is tied to the facts." Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350-
52 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted). This structure has received praise from
commentators. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Karen Blum, Fourth Amendment Stops, Arrests
and Searches in the Context of Qualified Immunity, 25 TOURO L. REV. 781, 791-92 (2009);
Jeffries, supra note 14, at 853. Professor Jeffries, however, notes that none of the
categories are "self-executing. Indeed, all require evaluative judgments-including, for
example, just how textually specific 'obvious clarity' must be .... Jeffries, supra note 14,
at 853. Therefore, "even this well-crafted test for 'clearly established' law will be fodder
for argument, unclear in application, and unsuccessful in predicting results." Id. at 854.
75. Richard B. Golden & Joseph L. Hubbard, Jr., Section 1983 Qualified Immunity
Defense: Hope's Legacy, Neither Clear nor Established, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 563, 584
(2006). Lanier has been similarly criticized. Golden and Hubbard compare the Supreme
Court's analysis in Lanier to Justice Potter Stewart's "I know it when I see it" obscenity
analysis in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). Golden &
Hubbard, supra, at 584.
76. 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam).
77. Id. at 196-97.
78. Id. at 197. There was "a felony no-bail warrant out for Haugen's arrest on drug
and other offenses." Id. at 195. Officer Brosseau arrived at the scene after hearing a report
that men were fighting in Haugen's mother's yard. Id.
79. Id. at 206 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 194-95 (per curiam).
81. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
82. 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
83. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199. Garner holds that police may only use deadly force to
prevent a suspect from escaping upon "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others." Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
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generality"'  and a "more particularized" standard must be met to
find a clearly established right.8 5 The Court noted that such general
rules can suffice without relevant precedent in an "obvious case,"
citing Hope as an example.86 But any discussion of Hope's approach
to finding clearly established rights, or what else might constitute an
obvious case, ended there. The Court concluded that Brosseau did
not fall into its "obvious" category and that no precedent "squarely
govern[ed]" the issue at hand.87
B. The Circuits Attempt to Reconcile Hope and Brosseau
It is unclear how the Eleventh Circuit's "rigid gloss" on qualified
immunity rejected in Hope is any different than the need for
precedent that "squarely governs" as called for by Brosseau.88 Strictly
applying Hope's standard to Brosseau's facts, it seems that the more
general rule in Garner should have sufficed to find Haugen's Fourth
Amendment right in that situation to be clearly established.89 This
apparent inconsistency has led to a variety of attempts among the
circuits to reconcile the two cases.9" The Sixth Circuit has explained
how Hope and Brosseau represent "two paths" to finding clearly
established rights: one where the constitutional violation is
sufficiently obvious such that a body of relevant case law is
unnecessary and one where the violation is shown by "particularized"
precedent.91 The Eighth Circuit has also recognized the validity of
both standards, while arguably sidestepping Brosseau's preference for
84. Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199.
85. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 201. The Court did not rule on whether Officer Brosseau's conduct actually
violated Haugen's constitutional rights: "We express no view as to the correctness of the
Court of Appeals' decision on the constitutional question itself. We believe that, however
that question is decided, the Court of Appeals was wrong on the issue of qualified
immunity." Id. at 198.
88. Chemerinsky & Blum, supra note 74, at 790; see also Golden & Hubbard, supra
note 75, at 599 n.222 ("Brosseau's ultimate holding seems to fly in the face of the language
in Hope that accused the Eleventh Circuit of placing a 'rigid gloss on the qualified
immunity standard ... [that] is not consistent with our cases.' " (quoting Hope v. Pelzer,
536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002))).
89. See Golden & Hubbard, supra note 75, at 598-99. As a practical matter, plaintiffs
generally point to Hope, and defendants point to Brosseau and other cases requiring a
showing of more particularized precedent. Chemerinsky & Blum, supra note 74, at 790.
90. The circuits have taken differing approaches to qualified immunity beyond
reconciling these two cases. See Jeffries, supra note 14, at 850-67.
91. See Golden & Hubbard, supra note 75, at 600-02 (discussing Lyons v. City of
Xenia, 417 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2005)).
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factually similar precedent in favor of Hope's broader reach.9 2
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has fully embraced Brosseau, mostly
ignoring Hope and the inherent tension between the two cases.93
Each approach has its strengths and weaknesses. The Sixth
Circuit has made a good faith attempt to reconcile them, but the test
for an "obvious" case remains undefined beyond whether a court
finds any given case to be as shocking as Hope.94 The Eighth Circuit
at least pays lip service to both Hope and Brosseau but suffers by
ultimately ignoring Brosseau, the most recent Supreme Court
decision on the subject that seems clearly aimed at reining in Hope.
While the Ninth Circuit keeps things relatively simple by ignoring
Hope, the case remains good law. Moreover, complete reliance on
factually similar precedent runs the risk of leaving victims of even the
most extreme governmental abuse without a remedy-perhaps the
main reason the Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's rigid approach
in the first place.95 While the Sixth Circuit may have the most
reasonable approach among the imperfect options available, looking
solely at the cases themselves, there is no obviously correct choice.
C. Clearly Established Rights in the Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit has not explicitly spelled out its take on
clearly established rights in light of Hope and Brosseau. Nor has it
gone to the lengths the Eleventh Circuit has in setting up a detailed
framework for the analysis.96 In the last decade, however, the Fourth
Circuit has been fairly generous in granting qualified immunity and,
in doing so, has produced some remarkable decisions. For example, in
Robles v. Prince George's County,97 police officers from Prince
George's County were attempting to transfer the recently arrested
Nelson Robles to neighboring Montgomery County.98 The officers
handcuffed him to a metal pole in a deserted parking lot at 3:30 a.m.,
92. See id. at 604-06 (discussing Craighead v. Lee, 399 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2005)).
93. See id. at 607 n.264, 607-09.
94. See id. at 614 ("[W]ithout such unique and egregious facts, the matter at hand
necessarily falls within the traditional Anderson and Brosseau line of cases that require
qualified immunity to attach .... ). It is at least possible, however, that judges can
consistently make these determinations. See Jacob Heller, Abominable Acts, 34 VT. L.
REV. 311, 350-51 (2009) (arguing that judges are fully capable of recognizing truly
"abominable" acts and denying qualified immunity in such cases).
95. See Golden & Hubbard, supra note 75, at 583 (arguing that the Hope decision may
have been motivated by the Court's "visceral reaction" to the facts of the case).
96. See supra note 74.
97. 302 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2002).
98. Id. at 267.
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leaving an unsigned note at his feet.99 They drove off and then
* telephoned a non-emergency number for the Montgomery police
without identifying themselves or relaying that Robles had been tied
to a pole. °° Montgomery police picked up Robles ten to fifteen
minutes later. 0 1 Robles sued under § 1983 and state law, and the
Fourth Circuit granted the Prince George's County officers qualified
immunity.10 2 In a footnote, the court disposed of Hope by essentially
confining the case to its own facts: Hope "involved a much lengthier
detention under painful and dangerous conditions amounting to cruel
and unusual punishment" and therefore was not controlling. 1 3 The
court then concluded that Robles had not satisfied Anderson's
preference for greater specificity; although Robles cited precedent
involving "instances where detainees were subject to physical abuse
or prolonged and inhumane conditions of detention," the conduct
here was not so egregious."° The court admonished the officers'
"Keystone Kop activity"'0" as degrading and found that they violated
Robles' right to due process. 106 However, even though the officers
were aware that their conduct was inappropriate, they could not have
been reasonably expected to know it was unconstitutional in that
particular context.0 7
In the more recent case of Henry v. Purnell,108 the Fourth Circuit
granted qualified immunity to a police officer who shot a fleeing,
unarmed suspect with his pistol when he had intended to grab his
Taser. 109 The court again emphasized the standard in Anderson,
holding that because no case law existed addressing whether such
"weapon confusion" by an officer was objectively reasonable or not,
he could not have reasonably been expected to know that he was
violating a clearly established right."'
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 266.
103. Id. at 269 n.2.
104. Id. at 271.
105. The Keystone Kops were an incompetent police force featured in silent films in
the early twentieth century. 6 NEw ENCYCLOPVEDIA BRITANNICA 825, 825 (15th ed.
1998).
106. Robles, 302 F.3d at 270-71.
107. Id.
108. 619 F.3d 323, 326 (4th Cir. 2010), rev'd en banc, 652 F.3d 524, 536-37 (4th Cir.
2011). The Fourth Circuit's reversal en banc is discussed in Part III.B, infra.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 337-38.
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The Fourth Circuit has not been absolutely consistent in its
requirement of spot-on precedent," but even post-Hope, its general
disposition has been clear: a plaintiff's allegedly violated rights must
have been clearly established by precedent with a high level of factual
similarity in order for the court to deny qualified immunity. 112 Bellotte
demonstrates a shift away from this standard.
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH IN BELLOTTE
In examining the issue of whether the Bellotte family's Fourth
Amendment right to be free from an unlawful no-knock entry was
clearly established, the Fourth Circuit found that it was, but did not
frame the issue in terms of Hope and Brosseau. Still, the court seems
to borrow from Hope-showing that the Fourth Circuit is now more
willing to recognize clearly established rights in the absence of highly
particularized precedent. Given the unsettled nature of qualified
immunity law today, this is an entirely reasonable approach. Given
how the court's approach balances government interests with
preserving constitutional protections, it is also a desirable one. This
Part examines the Bellotte court's reasoning and the Fourth Circuit's
subsequent qualified immunity decisions.
111. See Turmon v. Jordan, 405 F.3d 202, 206 (4th Cir. 2005) (denying qualified
immunity to a police officer who, upon noticing steam billowing from a motel-room
window, yelled at the plaintiff to open the door and then pointed a gun in his face before
roughly handcuffing him). The court held that "[a]lthough we have found no case exactly
like this one, we believe that the longstanding requirement of reasonable suspicion ...
gave Jordan 'fair warning that his alleged treatment of [Turmon] was unconstitutional.' "
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520, 531 (4th Cir.
2003)): see also Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 365-66 (4th Cir. 2001) (denying qualified
immunity to an officer who kneaded the plaintiffs buttocks and penetrated her genitals
with an ungloved hand while conducting a strip search).
112. See, e.g., Fields v. Prater, 566 F.3d 381, 391 (4th Cir. 2009) (granting qualified
immunity from a First Amendment claim against defendant members of a county board of
supervisors who took political affiliation into account when selecting an agency director).
Even though the Fourth Circuit had found such conduct unconstitutional in the context of
appointing county registrars, no precedent dealt specifically with agency directors. Id. at
389; see also Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 482 (4th Cir. 2005) (granting qualified
immunity to officers who shot and killed a fleeing suspect who posed no threat to the
officers, as the officers had already shot the suspect several times). The Waterman court
noted that "other circuits decided during [the relevant time] period that a passing risk to
an officer does not authorize him to employ deadly force moments after he should have
recognized the passing of the risk. However, this circuit did not." Waterman, 393 F.3d at
483 (citations omitted).
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A. The Court's Analysis in Bellotte
The majority opinion began with a discussion of whether exigent
circumstances justified the officers' no-knock entry into the Bellottes'
home. The court concluded that the entry was not justified, as none of
the officers' rationales were sufficiently particularized."' This analysis
took up most of the opinion. Addressing the officers' claim to
qualified immunity for the no-knock entry, on the other hand, took
up all of one paragraph, and the majority cited to neither Hope nor
Brosseau."4 Perhaps the court believed the result in this case to be so
clear that a more exhaustive analysis was unnecessary, or perhaps the
court believed any attempt to harmonize the current state of qualified
immunity law in any meaningful way was simply impossible. In any
event, applying those cases directly, the result should not change.
Even under Brosseau's conservative interpretation of the Hope
doctrine, Bellotte falls into the category of "obvious" cases where
precedent squarely governing the precise issue at hand is not
required."' Indeed, the court's emphasis on the "brashness" of the
officer's conduct over the absence of highly similar precedent evokes
this analysis." 6 However, it should be noted that the officers' conduct,
while most unfortunate, cannot reasonably be said to equal that of the
prison guards in Hope. Still, the officers' conduct went far beyond
what the Fourth Circuit had previously found permissible.
The specific factors considered by the Fourth Circuit in
determining whether an entry was justified-whether the suspected
crime was inherently violent; whether the suspect had a history of
violence; whether there was a real risk of the suspect committing
suicide; and whether there were unlawfully owned firearms on the
premises-demonstrate how the right claimed in Bellotte is a far cry
from those "abstract rights" the Supreme Court rejected in
Anderson."7 The Bellottes' right to be free from a no-knock entry
was not clearly established by a general constitutional provision.
Rather, the presence of Fourth Circuit case law providing the factors
to determine whether a no-knock entry was justified and the absence
113. Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415, 424 (4th Cir. 2011).
114. Curiously, the only citation made to either comes from the dissent, where Judge
Wynn cites to Hope when laying out the basics of what qualified immunity is and why it is
important. Id. at 428 (Wynn, J., dissenting in part).
115. See supra notes 72-74, 86 and accompanying text (discussing Hope as a case where
no factually-specific precedent was required because it was an "obvious" case and
Brosseau's reference to Hope as an "obvious" case).
116. See Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 424.
117. 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1987).
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of those factors made the case "obvious." Although the officers faced
a somewhat novel situation, it does not take sophisticated legal
reasoning to consider those factors here and conclude that, with none
of them present, performing a no-knock entry could not be justified.
This lack of requisite factors is similar to the issues considered in
Turmon v. Jordan,11 where the Fourth Circuit denied an officer
qualified immunity from an excessive force claim because the "factors
for measuring the governmental interests at stake [were] absent." 119
While the severity of the constitutional violations in Turmon and
Bellotte should not be trivialized,12 ° they also cannot be equated with
the violations in Hope. This strongly suggests that a case should not
necessarily have to shock the conscience to be obvious. Even ignoring
Hope altogether and applying Anderson's more particularized
standard-one that is aimed at giving "practical guidance to a street-
level official"1 21-the outcome still should not change, as the case law
makes clear that no-knock entries are only permissible where police
can make a particularized showing of risk. Because the officers in
Turmon could only point to their own speculation, qualified immunity
was properly denied.
Whatever the court's reasons for avoiding Hope and Brosseau,
the Bellotte court's ultimate finding of a clearly established right was
based on precedent at least somewhat removed from the facts of the
case before it. Judge Wynn emphasized this in his dissent.122 For
example, the majority cited to United States v. Grogins123 to illustrate
how dealing with a crime "more closely connected with violence"
could justify a no-knock entry.124 However, because the suspect in
that case was a "notorious drug dealer with a history of violence,"
wrote Judge Wynn, the case "did little to inform the officers here
whether a no-knock entry into a suspected child abuser's home-
where the suspect, multiple firearms, and the child victim were
believed to be present-was lawful." '125 While the precedent relied on
by the majority laid out factors that may amount to exigent
circumstances, in Judge Wynn's opinion those cases did not provide
118. 405 F.3d 202 (4th Cir. 2005).
119. Id. at 207.
120. See supra note 111.
121. Jeffries, supra note 14, at 854.
122. Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415, 431 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wynn, J., dissenting in
part).
123. 163 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 1998).
124. Bellotte, 629 F.3d at 423 (majority opinion) (citing United States v. Grogins, 163
F.3d 795, 799 (4th Cir. 1998)).
125. Id. at 431 (Wynn, J., dissenting in part).
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clear instructions to the officers in this particular situation. "Thus,
there were no 'bright lines' demarcating the limits of a reasonable
suspicion of danger under these circumstances," and therefore "no
preexisting law clearly established the unlawfulness of this particular
entry." ' 6 But the current state of qualified immunity law, muddled as
it is, does not-and because Hope remains good law, should not-
strictly require such precedent.
B. Beyond Bellotte
The Bellotte court signaled that the Fourth Circuit would be
more willing to allow § 1983 claims to proceed to trial even when
there is no precedent directly on point. Two months later, the Fourth
Circuit decided another qualified immunity case. In Brockington v.
Boykins,127 Tim Brockington fell to the ground after being shot twice
by Officer Boykins.128 Brockington was unarmed. Then, Officer
Boykins stood over the unarmed Brockington and fired six or more
shots at point-blank range, rendering him a paraplegic. 129 Brockington
conceded that the initial use of deadly force to subdue him was
reasonable but argued that the ensuing shots violated his clearly
established rights.13° Officer Boykins claimed qualified immunity,
arguing "that the right was not clearly established because, by virtue
of the fact there were multiple shots, it was necessarily a gray area
when further shooting became prohibited." '131 The court disagreed.
Citing Hope, the court explained "it is not required that the exact
conduct has been found unconstitutional in a previous case....
Indeed, it is just common sense that continuing to shoot someone who
is already incapacitated is not justified under these circumstances. 1 2
Garner and other Fourth Circuit precedent, while addressing factually
distinguishable situations, were enough. 133
This trend continued several months later with the court's
reversal of Henry v. Purnell (the mistaken weapon case) upon
rehearing en banc."' Again, the court primarily based its decision on
the general rule regarding deadly force from Garner.35 Despite the
126. Id. at 432 (quoting Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258, 271 (4th Cir. 2007)).
127. 637 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 2011).
128. Id. at 505.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 507.
131. Id. at 508.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
135. Id. at 536-37.
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lack of precedent specifically addressing an officer accidentally
grabbing the wrong weapon, the majority found the officer's actions
to be objectively unreasonable: "a reasonable officer would have
realized he was holding a firearm when shooting[,] ... [and] it would
have been clear to a reasonable officer that shooting a fleeing,
nonthreatening misdemeanant with a firearm was unlawful."' 36 As
Judge Niemeyer noted in dissent, "it can readily be concluded that
there is no clearly established law governing when such a mistake
would be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."'37 Also
dissenting, Judge Shedd pointed out how this decision produced an
odd inconsistency with Robles'38: if those foolish officers had been
granted qualified immunity for their "Keystone Kop activity," how
could Officer Purnell, who made an honest mistake, be denied? 139
It appears the Fourth Circuit's view on qualified immunity has
shifted in favor of plaintiffs. But even in the wake of this shift, the
Fourth Circuit has still been cautious to award qualified immunity
where the law truly offers government officers no clear guidance. In
Braun v. Maynard,4 ° police used an ion scanning machine to search
for controlled substances on employees at the Maryland Department
of Public Safety and Correctional Services.' The device signaled that
drugs were present on several employees who were then searched.
Nothing was discovered, and the employees subsequently brought a
§ 1983 claim alleging violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. 142
The trial court granted qualified immunity, and the Fourth Circuit
affirmed, explaining that, "[a]lthough it was clearly established that
intrusive prison employee searches require reasonable suspicion, it
was far from clear that the devices at issue here could not meet that
standard. 143
Taken together, Bellotte and subsequent Fourth Circuit qualified
immunity decisions demonstrate a reasonable, balanced approach to
finding clearly established rights given the conflicting signals from the
Supreme Court. Because the Bellotte approach does not require
precedent that squarely addresses the circumstances, plaintiffs have a
somewhat relaxed burden in showing that their rights were clearly
136. Id. at 534.
137. Id. at 555 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
138. Robles v. Prince George's County is discussed supra at notes 97-107.
139. Henry, 652 F.3d at 552 (Shedd, J., dissenting).
140. 652 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 2011).
141. Id. at 558.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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established, but government officers are still not expected to infer
highly particularized rights from truly abstract, general rules.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Bellotte's relaxed standard for finding clearly established rights
furthers two important policy objectives: (1) allowing more legitimate
civil claims against government officers to survive summary judgment,
thereby making it easier for victims of government abuse to recover
damages, and (2) deterring unconstitutional, often dangerous no-
knock entries.
Subjecting government officers to civil liability is one way to hold
them accountable for abusing their publically entrusted power."'
When qualified immunity is asserted as a defense to civil suits, there
are two competing interests that must be carefully balanced:
"compensating those who have been injured by official conduct and
protecting government's ability to perform its traditional
functions."' 45 When that balance is unfairly tipped toward protecting
the government, citizens and their constitutional rights necessarily
suffer: because qualified immunity is generally decided on a pre-trial
motion, fewer legitimate civil claims will survive summary judgment
and reach the ears of a jury.146 This is the natural consequence of the
rigid approach to finding clearly established rights that was rejected in
Hope and perhaps resurrected in Brosseau.147 Even victims of the
most extreme government abuse may be left without a remedy.148
The Supreme Court's decision in Hudson v. Michigan
underscores how important civil liability may be in protecting
constitutional rights. In that case, the Court held that evidence seized
after an unconstitutional no-knock entry did not have to be excluded
144. See Golden & Hubbard, supra note 75, at 565-66.
145. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992).
146. See Jeffries, supra note 14, at 863 ("If 'clearly established' law requires a prior
ruling on similar facts, then defendants will be entitled to summary judgment whenever
there happens to be no binding precedent precisely on point. This solves the summary
judgment problem but only by grossly distorting qualified immunity.").
147. See Mark R. Brown, The Fall and Rise of Qualified Immunity: From Hope to
Harris, 9 NEV. L.J. 185, 197 (2008) (stating that before the Supreme Court decided Hope,
the Eleventh Circuit "became 'the circuit of "unqualified immunity." ' From roughly 1990
to 2002, constitutional victims' chances of winning money damages from government
officials' [sic] in the Eleventh Circuit closely approached zero." (quoting Elizabeth J.
Norman & Jacob E. Daly, Statutory Civil Rights, 53 MERCER L. REV. 1499, 1556 (2002))).
148. See generally Heller, supra note 94 (discussing cases of extreme government
misconduct where the officers were nevertheless awarded qualified immunity).
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at trial.149 This removed one of, if not the, most powerful deterrents to
such government misconduct. 0
Now, only by letting more civil claims survive summary
judgment, as the Fourth Circuit's new approach to qualified immunity
looks to do, can courts give civil liability the teeth necessary to help
reset the balance of interests at stake.
A. Avoiding Unconscionable Results and Promoting Government
Accountability
As discussed above, a strict requirement of highly particularized
precedent can produce shocking results. Larry Hope "was treated in a
way antithetical to human dignity" by prison guards, yet the Eleventh
Circuit still denied him relief.' Frederick Henry was shot and nearly
robbed of his life by a police officer who made the profound mistake
of firing his pistol instead of his Taser, yet the Fourth Circuit initially
denied him relief as well.152 The problem here is simple: if such results
are allowed, qualified immunity is no longer a reasonable way to
protect government officers from frivolous lawsuits; instead, it
becomes an explicit and radical prioritization of the government over
the individual.
This Recent Development does not suggest that government
officers must be held liable for every mistake that leads to a
distressing result. There have been and will be cases where a call in
the line of duty goes the wrong way-perhaps even resulting in the
death of an innocent person-and the officer responsible is rightfully
protected by qualified immunity. For example, in Milstead v. Kibler,5'
police exchanged gunfire with a suspect in a house who had assaulted
the residents inside.'54 At one point, "someone came crashing through
the door 'in a run' and turned toward where Officer Kibler was
positioned."' 55 Kibler fired twice at the man he believed to be the
assailant, killing him.'56 As it turned out, this person was not the
assailant, but rather was Milstead, one of the residents trying to
149. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006).
150. See Daniel A. Gutin, Note, Technical Knockout: Hudson v. Michigan and the
Unfortunate Demise of the Knock-and-Announce Rule, 44 AM. CR1M. L. REV. 1239, 1262-
66 (2007).
151. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736, 745 (2002).
152. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
153. 243 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2001).
154. Id. at 160.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 160-61.
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escape.'57 Because of poor lighting, Kibler's belief that Milstead had
been shot and therefore could not run, and Kibler's knowledge that
the assailant had a gun moments earlier, the Fourth Circuit found the
mistake to be objectively reasonable and affirmed the district court's
award of qualified immunity. 15 8
The doctrine of qualified immunity acknowledges the grim
reality that government officers are also humans-some mistakes are
inevitable. However, if a constitutional violation is clearly established,
to measure its reasonableness strictly by whether a court has
previously decided a very similar case invites the system of
accountability under § 1983 and Bivens to fail.159 Under this approach,
citizens would often enjoy their constitutional protections in name
only.
B. Deterring Unconstitutional No-Knock Entries
Civil liability of government officers is especially important in
the context of no-knock entries. The knock-and-announce rule is
aimed at preventing unnecessary violence between civilians and
police, avoiding unnecessary destruction of property, and preserving
citizens' privacy interests. 160 Entries dispensing with the rule have
increased "from 2,000 to 3,000 raids a year in the mid-1980s, to 70,000
to 80,000 annually"'161 and have recently produced some tragic
results. 162 Although Justice Kennedy asserted in Hudson that there
was no "widespread pattern" of unlawful no-knock entries, 163 Justice
157. Id. at 161.
158. Id. at 165.
159. See Jeffries, supra note 14, at 865 ("The search for a precedent specific to the
circumstances presented in this case sets an almost impossible standard for clearly
established law, effectively precluding vindication of constitutional rights through money
damages." (internal quotation marks omitted)); supra note 10 (explaining a Bivens action).
160. Gutin, supra note 150, at 1241.
161. Ron Barnett & Paul Alongi, Critics Knock No-Knock Police Raids, USA TODAY
(Aug. 3, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-02-14-noknockl4 STN.htm.
162. See Cecil Angel, Todd Spangler & George Sipple, Conyers Seeks Federal Probe of
Aiyana's Death, DETROIT FREE PRESS (May 20, 2010), http://www.freep.com/article
/20100520/NEWS015200591/Conyers-seeks-federal-probe-Aiyana-s-death; Editorial,
Better Planning Could Help Arrest Botched Police Raids, USA TODAY (Apr. 25, 2004),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2004-04-25-our-view_x.htm; Brian Haas,
Parents of Man Shot by Police During Drug Raid File Lawsuit, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale, Fla.) (Mar. 17, 2007), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2007-03-17/news
/0703160615_1_swat-team-drug-raid-grand-jury; Bill Rankin, Atlanta Police Look To
Restore Trust After Drug Raid Killing, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Feb. 23, 2009), http://www
.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/atantastories/2009/02/23/johnston-sentencing.html.
163. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 604 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
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Breyer pointed out that there was in fact a well-documented
multitude of knock-and-announce violations.16" The Bellotte court
recognized the gravity of the interests protected by the knock-and-
announce requirement and that dispensing with the rule must be done
carefully: "To permit a no-knock entry on facts this paltry would be
to regularize the practice. ... [T]he Fourth Amendment does not
regard as reasonable an entry with echoes, however faint, of the
totalitarian state., 1
65
Before 2006, the exclusionary rule was the primary deterrent to
knock-and-announce violations. 166 Police would be deterred from
committing such violations if they knew that the evidence discovered
in the ensuing search would be inadmissible at trial.'67 In Hudson,
decided in 2006, the Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule
did not apply to evidence seized after an unconstitutional no-knock
entry. 168 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained how the
Court could not "assume that exclusion in this context is necessary
deterrence simply because we found that it was necessary deterrence
in different contexts and long ago.' '1 69 Since the birth of the
exclusionary rule, he noted, civil liability of government officers had
greatly expanded to include federal officers and to "reach the deep
pocket of municipalities."'70 Citing four examples, Justice Scalia
explained that qualified immunity did not present a significant burden
to suits for knock-and-announce violations.17' "As far as we know,"
he wrote, "civil liability is an effective deterrent .*..."1" This,
combined with greater access to public interest lawyers, the
"increasing professionalism of police forces," and more citizen review
164. Id. at 610 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing The Warrant Requirement, 34 GEO. L.J.
ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 19, 31-35 (2005); William D. Bremer, Annotation, What
Constitutes Compliance with Knock-and-Announce Rule in Search of Private Premises-
State Cases, 85 A.L.R. 5TH 1 (2001)).
165. Bellotte v. Edwards, 629 F.3d 415, 421 (4th Cir. 2011).
166. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 629 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[W]ithout suppression there
is little to deter knock-and-announce violations."); see also Gutin, supra note 150, at 1246
(citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 670 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring)) (noting that the
exclusionary rule is the most meaningful deterrent as compared with other remedies).
167. See David Alan Sklansky, Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 567, 582 (2008); Gutin, supra note 150, at 1246-47.
168. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594.
169. Id. at 597.
170. Id. at 597-98.
171. Id. at 598.
172. Id.
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boards, has apparently rendered the exclusionary rule in this context
obsolete.173
In dissent, Justice Breyer called the majority's view on civil
liability a "support-free assumption." '174 Even Michigan's amici
believed that, due to the state of civil immunity doctrines, civil
liability could not adequately replace the exclusionary rule. 175
Professor Sklansky has noted that "[m]ore and more, [immunity
doctrines] look like the Blob That Ate Section 1983. "176 While Justice
Scalia emphasized how civil liability has become a more effective
deterrent to police misconduct since the 1960s, there is little evidence
of this.'77 Nor is there strong evidence that the other regulating
factors mentioned by Justice Scalia can make up the difference.78
We can fume about Hudson all we want,17 9 but until the Supreme
Court revisits no-knock entries, civil liability remains one of the last,
best deterrents. While the Hudson majority opinion might be a thinly
veiled attack on the exclusionary rule, its emphasis on civil liability as
an effective deterrent must be taken at face value. 80 To play a truly
significant role in filling the void of the exclusionary rule,' civil
liability must become the effective deterrent the majority proclaimed
it is already. For this to happen, courts must be more conservative in
granting qualified immunity and allow more claims to survive
summary judgment, just as the Fourth Circuit did in Bellotte.
173. Id. at 598-99.
174. Id. at 611 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 610.
176. Sklansky, supra note 167, at 572.
177. Id. at 580 (noting that far more cases are thrown out under the exclusionary rule
than § 1983 claims filed, and most of those are unsuccessful); see also CHARLES H.
WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 58-59 (4th ed. 2000)
("Under current law, a damages suit is not feasible when damages are negligible, as is the
case with many Fourth Amendment (and other constitutional) violations, and the victim
poor, as are most persons investigated by the police.").
178. Gutin, supra note 150, at 1262-64.
179. Professor LaFave does this especially well. Hudson, he says, "deserves a special
niche in the Supreme Court's pantheon of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as one
would be hard-pressed to find another case with so many bogus arguments piled atop one
another." 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.4, at 52 (4th ed. Supp. 2011-
2012).
180. See Sklansky, supra note 167, at 570.
181. Of course, because no criminal charges were ever filed, the exclusionary rule was
of little help to the Bellottes after the raid. However, the officers may have hesitated
before executing the no-knock entry had they thought it more likely that any fruits of the
search would have been inadmissible.
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V. ADDRESSING CONCERNS
The dangers of tipping the scales of qualified immunity in favor
of the government are apparent, but what if the balance shifts too far
the other way? If courts are less willing to grant qualified immunity,
as the Fourth Circuit was in Bellotte, government officers may be
subject to more litigation that inhibits them from performing their
jobs effectively. They may be liable for their mistakes even though
courts have not provided them situation-specific guidelines to avoid
unconstitutional behavior. This could result in an undesirable
"chilling effect" on officers who perform important and sometimes
dangerous jobs. As the Fourth Circuit has noted, "[i]f every mistaken
seizure were to subject police officers to personal liability under
§ 1983, those same officers would come to realize that the safe and
cautious course was always to take no action."1 s2 If government
officers were actually required to infer that their conduct was
unconstitutional from highly generalized legal principles, this would
naturally be the result."8 3
This, however, is not the case in the Fourth Circuit. First of all, in
light of Brosseau, a showing of highly particularized precedent is still
the Supreme Court's preferred way of determining clearly established
rights."l 4 Police and other government officers receive detailed
training as to the constitutional rules they must work with every
day."15 However, simply because application of constitutional rules to
real-world situations may not always be crystal clear does not mean
officers should be immune whenever they get it wrong. To respect the
rights of citizens, there must be some room in the equation for
182. Gooden v. Howard Cnty., 954 F.2d 960, 967 (4th Cir. 1992) (en bane).
183. See Golden & Hubbard, supra note 75, at 611 ("It is quite another level of
complexity to try to survey all cases relevant to a determination of whether a defendant's
conduct so obviously violates some generalized constitutional law principle that the
defendant supposedly had fair warning that his conduct was constitutionally
inappropriate.").
184. See Heller, supra note 94, at 320; supra Part II.A.
185. See, e.g., Corey Fleming Hirokawa, Comment, Making the "Law of the Land" the
Law of the Street: How Police Academies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, 49
EMORY L.J. 295, 319-27 (2000) (discussing how different police academies in and around
Atlanta, Georgia, provide instruction on fluid Fourth Amendment concepts); see also
Sklansky, supra note 167, at 581 (discussing how police academy materials in California
provide instruction as to the constitutionality of garbage searches); Jacqueline Blaesi-
Freed, Comment, From Shield to Suit of Armor: Qualified Immunity and a Narrowing of
Constitutional Rights in the Tenth Circuit, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 203, 227 (2010) (explaining
that some "circuits have held that officials must apply 'esoteric' doctrines in spite of their
complicated nature").
1264 [Vol. 90
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
common sense, common decency, and 'the ability of reasonable
officers to apply these principles to somewhat unfamiliar situations.1 8 6
Second, considering how the more particularized standards in
Anderson and Brosseau allow government officers to carry out their
duties with minimal fear of harassing litigation, the only conduct that
will truly be deterred is the kind of especially horrifying or plainly
foolish conduct at issue in cases like Hope, Robles, and Bellotte.
Courts remain free to grant qualified immunity to officers who make
a bad guess in "gray areas" of law. The Fourth Circuit's recent
qualified immunity decisions are illustrative. While the officers who
conduct an entirely unjustified no-knock entry or shoot an injured,
unarmed suspect multiple times at close range will be denied qualified
immunity, officers who employ a new, high-tech crime-fighting
technique that courts have never considered will be protected. 187
CONCLUSION
Qualified immunity protects government officers from liability
when they make reasonable mistakes. Given the often dangerous and
difficult nature of their jobs, this is a good thing. However, the
Supreme Court has not made clear what level of "clearly established"
law is necessary to give government officers fair warning that their
conduct may violate someone's constitutional rights. Until recently,
the Fourth Circuit had required a highly particularized level of
precedent. While this approach is relatively straight-forward in
application, it also tends to make qualified immunity look more like
absolute immunity. Government accountability and constitutional
protections suffer as a result. Bellotte demonstrates how the Fourth
Circuit has moved away from this highly deferential standard; it is
now more willing to let civil suits proceed to trial even in the absence
of case law "on all fours" with the conduct at issue. Given the
uncertainty surrounding qualified immunity and the deeply important
interests at stake, this is a reasonable, common-sense way to perform
a difficult balancing act. Victims of government abuse get a fair
chance at redress, yet government officers will not be so inhibited by
the threat of a lawsuit as to significantly affect the performance of
their duties. While efficient government operations and constitutional
186. See Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 536 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) ("Especially in
light of the fact that the Taser and firearm were holstered on the same side of Purnell's
body, a reasonable jury could conclude that [verification of the weapon] would only
amount to common sense.").
187. See supra Part III.B.
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freedoms may never live together in perfect harmony, this approach
produces a lesser discord that we can more easily accept.
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